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WHEN INSIDERS BECOME OUTSIDERS:
PARENTAL OBJECTIONS TO PUBLIC SCHOOL
SEX EDUCATION PROGRAMS
EMILY J. BROWN†
ABSTRACT
This Note argues that parents’ fundamental right to direct their
children’s moral and educational upbringing includes the right to
exempt their children from objectionable sex education programs in
public schools. Schools usurp parents’ fundamental rights when they
unilaterally introduce children to topics of human sexuality without
parental notice or permission. Alleged violations of these rights merit
strict scrutiny review from courts. When parents’ objections are
confined to discrete, tangible events, parents are constitutionally
entitled to exempt their children from objectionable activities. The
efficacy of this constitutional relief is more limited, however, when
parental objections are pervasive and unassociated with a particular
aspect of the school’s program or curriculum.

INTRODUCTION
1

Public education has deep roots in America. The state has an
interest in ensuring that its citizens receive an education that enables
2
them to be productive and useful citizens. But the child is not the
creature of the state, and parents have a fundamental right to direct
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1. E.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
2. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) (“Providing public schools ranks
at the very apex of the function of a State.”); Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 (“[E]ducation is perhaps
the most important function of state and local governments. . . . It is the very foundation of good
citizenship.”).
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their children’s educational, moral, and religious upbringing. Public
education creates opportunities for tension between parents and the
state because each seeks to influence child development. In the
context of public education, when states make administrative and
policy decisions to educate students effectively, parents’ individual
preferences must yield by some degree—exactly how much, however,
is an open question.
The contours of parental rights in the context of public schools
are ambiguous. The Supreme Court has long held that parents have a
4
fundamental right to control the upbringing of their children. This
5
right, often referred to as the Meyer-Pierce right, is rooted in the
substantive due process protections afforded by the Fourteenth
6
Amendment. In light of Supreme Court jurisprudence, some
parameters of parental rights are clear: the state cannot force parents
7
to enroll their children in public school, and parents cannot
legitimately dispute reasonable regulations or curriculum
8
requirements. But uncertainty abounds in the legal terrain between
these extremes. The Supreme Court has not addressed what happens
when parents wish to exempt their child from certain public school

3. E.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66
(2000) (plurality opinion) (summarizing the Supreme Court’s parental rights jurisprudence and
concluding, “[i]n light of this extensive precedent, it cannot now be doubted that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to
make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children”).
4. See supra note 3.
5. E.g., Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1204 (9th Cir. 2005). Because it was
articulated in its earliest forms in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), this Note will use the terms “Meyer-Pierce right,” “Meyer-Pierce
doctrine,” and “parental rights” to refer to parents’ fundamental right to control the upbringing
of their children.
6. E.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65–66 (plurality opinion) (“[I]t cannot now be doubted that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to
make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.”). Substantive due
process rests on the notion that some rights are so fundamental to the Fourteenth Amendment’s
concept of liberty that they are “to a great extent . . . immune from federal or state regulation or
proscription.” Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986), overruled on other grounds by
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
7. E.g., Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
8. See, e.g., id. at 534 (“No question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably
to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to
require that all children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral
character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must
be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare.”).

BROWN IN FINAL FINAL.DOCFINAL FINAL

9/15/2009 8:09:57 PM

2009] PARENTAL OBJECTIONS TO SEX EDUCATION

111

programs or when, if ever, public schools transgress their legitimate
authority as educators and usurp the parental role.
Perhaps the tensions between parents and state educators are
best illustrated by the Sixth Circuit case, Mozert v. Hawkins County
9
Board of Education. Christian fundamentalist parents brought the
suit, alleging that the series assigned for a “critical reading” course
violated their right to control their children’s moral and religious
10
upbringing. The court rejected the parents’ claim, holding that the
program did not amount to a violation because it did not compel
11
students to affirm or deny any antithetical beliefs and because public
schools need not tailor their curricula to accommodate specific
12
parental preferences.
Although the Sixth Circuit’s opinion would suggest that the
13
school’s victory was relatively straightforward, the claim was in fact
14
much more complex. Professor Nomi Maya Stolzenberg articulates
the unique problem posed by the dispute:
Because the plaintiffs did not represent themselves as insular
outsiders seeking to inhabit a perfectly separated sphere, their right
to exit the public school system completely did not respond to their
complaint. Conversely, because they did not seek to reshape or
convert the public sphere, the school authorities could not readily
dismiss their claim as an interference with the right of other students
to be free from religious impositions. The Mozert plaintiffs were
neither outsiders nor insiders. They sought to be both—and this

9. Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
10. The plaintiffs’ parental rights claim was premised on their assertion that the reading
series was antithetical to their religious beliefs. Id. at 1060–61; see also Nomi Maya Stolzenberg,
“He Drew a Circle that Shut Me Out”: Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal
Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 581, 595–97 (1993) (listing twenty-eight violations alleged by the
plaintiffs).
11. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1070.
12. Id. at 1064.
13. Id. at 1074 (Boggs, J., concurring) (“Under the court’s assessment of the facts, this is a
most uninteresting case. . . . The court reviews the record and finds that the plaintiffs actually
want a school system that affirmatively teaches the correctness of their religion, and prevents
other students from mentioning contrary ideas. If that is indeed the case, then it can be very
easily resolved. It would obviously violate the Establishment Clause for any school system to
agree with such an extravagant view.”).
14. See Stolzenberg, supra note 10, at 591 (“Although the Mozert plaintiffs identified
particular offensive ‘teachings,’ . . . their quarrel with the assigned series of textbooks was
broader than that. They explicitly objected to the school’s presentation of differing values and
beliefs. . . . In other words, the plaintiffs objected to the very principles—tolerance and
evenhandedness—traditionally used to justify liberal education.”).
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posture made their resistance to exposure to diversity particularly
15
difficult to understand.

In essence, then, the question is what happens when parents seek
to be both insiders and outsiders. If a goal of public education is
16
exposure to diverse views, then ushering those with minority
viewpoints to the exit is counterproductive. To what extent can a
purportedly liberal education system refuse to accommodate minority
views without betraying its liberal label?
The questions posed by Mozert remain live issues, particularly in
the context of sex education (“sex-ed”). Although states claim that
17
sex-ed fits within the ambit of their educational mission, many
parents are concerned that public schools’ introduction of human
sexuality to young students usurps their parental right to direct their
18
children’s moral and religious upbringing. Schools resist granting
exemptions on the grounds that accommodation impermissibly
19
submits public education to parental preferences. As in Mozert, the
parents who bring these suits are both insiders and outsiders: they
desire public education’s benefits for their children, but not at the
expense of their parental rights.
This Note uses sex-ed programs to explore the contours of
parental rights and constitutional remedies in the context of public
20
schools. Sex-ed programs provide an especially apt vehicle for this
15. Id. at 590–91; see also Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1060–61 (noting that the parents only brought
their challenge when the school discontinued an “alternative program” that had enabled the
plaintiffs’ children to opt out from the critical reading class).
16. E.g., Stolzenberg, supra note 10, at 659.
17. Twenty-one states require public schools to educate their students about sexuality,
disease prevention, or reproduction, and ten states permit (but do not require) such instruction.
David Rigsby, Sex Education in Schools, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 895, 895–96 (2006).
18. Parents undisputedly have the sole legal right to provide for children’s spiritual and
religious development. Establishment Clause jurisprudence forbids public schools from
contributing to the religious upbringing of children, even at parents’ behest or approval. See,
e.g., Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1984) (holding that a public school’s
approval of voluntary religious instruction during the school day violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments).
19. See, e.g., Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 534 (1st Cir. 1995) (“If
all parents had a fundamental constitutional right to dictate individually what schools teach
their children, the schools would be forced to cater to a curriculum for each student whose
parents had genuine moral disagreements with the school’s choice of subject matter.”).
20. It is undisputed that parents have the right to enroll their child in a private educational
curriculum. E.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). When parents are able and
willing to make that choice, they presumably retain a maximum control over their child’s
religious and moral upbringing. The more interesting question, however, and the focus of this
Note, is the extent of parents’ rights within public schools.
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discussion because they often implicate deeply held beliefs, they
22
incite political controversy, and they are arguably at the margins of
23
schools’ core educational functions. Supreme Court jurisprudence
leaves the extent of parents’ constitutional rights in this context
uncertain, and legal scholarship has given little attention to the
24
question of constitutional remedies within public schools. This Note
argues that parents are constitutionally entitled to exempt their
children from objectionable sex-ed programs and activities. Part I
discusses the legal posture of parental rights by highlighting relevant
Supreme Court case law and then analyzing several circuit court
decisions that involve parental challenges to sex-ed programs. Part II
demonstrates that sex-ed falls within the scope of parents’
fundamental rights and that parental rights merit strict scrutiny
judicial review. Part III develops and defends a bright-line rule that
parents are constitutionally entitled to exempt their children from
discrete objectionable activities or programs. Part IV discusses the
limitations of judicial remedies in situations in which parents’
objections are “not neatly tied to considerations of curriculum or
25
educational environment.”

21. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
22. E.g., Megan Boldt, Lawmakers Let Sex Ed Debate Rage, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS,
June 11, 2007, at A1; Erin Richards, Milwaukee Area School Districts Grapple with Sex-Ed
Policies: Districts Shy Away, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 6, 2008, at B1, available at
http://www.jsonline.com/news/education/29428549.html.
23. See infra Part III.C.
24. A number of law review articles have commented on the tensions between parental
rights and liberal education. E.g., Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist
Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 937, 937–1034 (1996); Stolzenberg, supra note 10, at 589–667; Tyll
van Geel, Citizenship Education and the Exercise of Religion, 34 AKRON L. REV. 293, 372–81
(2000). Scholarship regarding a constitutional entitlement to exemptions is, however, more
limited and does not specifically address the problems posed by parents’ objections to sex-ed or
other discrete aspects of public education. See, e.g., Keith Brough, Note, Sex Education Left at
the Threshold of the School Door: Stricter Requirements for Parental Opt-Out Provisions, 46
FAM. CT. REV. 409, at 412–13 (2008) (arguing that opt-out provisions are not constitutionally
necessary); Elliott M. Davis, Recent Case, Unjustly Usurping the Parental Right: Fields v.
Palmdale School District, 427 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2005), 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1133,
1143–44 (2006) (lamenting courts’ failure to adequately protect parental rights); Heather M.
Good, Comment, “The Forgotten Child of Our Constitution”: The Parental Free Exercise Right
to Direct the Education and Religious Upbringing of Children, 54 EMORY L.J. 641, 641–79 (2005)
(arguing for a more robust hybrid rights doctrine); Michael E. Lechliter, Note, The Free
Exercise of Religion and Public Schools: The Implications of Hybrid Rights on the Religious
Upbringing of Children, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2209, 2237–41 (2005) (arguing in favor of a more
robust hybrid rights analysis to protect parental rights).
25. C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 183 (3d Cir. 2005).
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I. THE LEGAL POSTURE OF PARENTAL RIGHTS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
When parents enroll their children in public school, they
surrender a substantial degree of control over how and what their
26
children are taught. In the midst of a dearth of Supreme Court
guidance regarding the scope of parental rights, the question is
whether parental rights retain vitality once children cross the
schoolhouse door. This Part discusses the current legal climate
regarding parental rights and sex-ed. Section A presents the Supreme
Court decisions that form the legal foundation for parental rights.
Section B then illustrates the uncertainty and disagreement among
federal circuit courts regarding the scope of parents’ rights,
particularly with respect to sex-ed programs in public schools.
A. Parental Rights and the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has said that “[i]t is cardinal . . . that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents,
whose primary function and freedom include preparation for
27
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.” There is
consequently a “private realm of family life which the state cannot
28
enter.”
29
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Supreme Court invalidated a
30
law requiring children to attend public school.
The law
impermissibly restricted parents’ substantive due process rights,
which, the Court declared, included the choice to enroll their children
31
in private schools. The Pierce decision came on the heels of an
32
earlier parental rights decision, Meyer v. Nebraska, in which the
Court struck down a law prohibiting schools from teaching any
foreign language prior to eighth grade because it interfered with

26. For instance, parents generally cannot challenge a school’s academic calendar,
graduation requirements, or curriculum decisions (such as teaching the multiplication table in
the second grade). E.g., Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 102 (1st Cir. 2008); C.N., 430 F.3d at 182;
Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1204 (9th Cir. 2005); Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch.
Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 395–96 (6th Cir. 2005); Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 141 (2d Cir.
2003); Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 291 (5th Cir. 2001); Swanson v.
Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 694, 702 (10th Cir. 1998).
27. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
28. Id.
29. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
30. Id. at 534–35.
31. Id.
32. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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parents’ substantive due process right to educate their children.
Elaborating on Meyer, the Pierce Court held that, “The child is not
the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
34
prepare him for additional obligations.” These additional obligations
“include the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and
35
elements of good citizenship.” The Pierce language suggests that
these realms may be the exclusive province of parents; however, the
Court also affirmed the state’s power to require that “certain studies
36
plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught.” Thus, both
parents and the state are charged with equipping children for the
elements of good citizenship, but parents appear to have a
constitutional monopoly over children’s moral and spiritual
37
development.
A final iconic Supreme Court decision respecting parental rights
38
is Wisconsin v. Yoder. In Yoder, the Court exempted Amish parents
39
from compulsory schooling laws. Yoder is therefore broader than
Meyer and Pierce because the Amish parents sought to excuse their
40
children from formal schooling requirements altogether. In granting
the exemption, the Court relied on both free exercise and substantive
41
due process grounds. Yoder thus stands as a significant building
block for parents’ constitutional right to direct their children’s
education and to control their children’s moral and religious
upbringing.

33. Id. at 400–01.
34. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
35. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972).
36. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534.
37. States clearly cannot contribute to children’s spiritual upbringing, for that would run
afoul of the Establishment Clause. E.g., Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203,
209–11 (1948); see also, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992) (holding that a school
graduation prayer violated the Establishment Clause). Given the connection between morality
and religion, states at least must tread lightly and carefully when directing children’s moral
upbringing.
38. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
39. Id. at 234.
40. Id. at 209 (“[A]ttendance at high school, public or private, was contrary to the Amish
religion and way of life.”).
41. Id. at 233 (“[W]hen the interests of parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim
of the nature revealed by this record, more than merely ‘a reasonable relation to some purpose
within the competency of the State’ is required to sustain the validity of the State’s requirement
under the First Amendment.”).
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In its most recent decision regarding parental rights, Troxel v.
42
Granville, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that parents’ right to direct
their children’s upbringing “is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental
43
liberty interests recognized by [the] Court.” In Troxel, the Court
struck down a law permitting any person to petition for visitation
rights at any time as violating parents’ substantive due process right
44
to direct the “care, custody, and control of their children.” Unlike
the statutes at issue in its predecessor cases, which involved flat
prohibitions, the statute in Troxel did not take the children away from
their mother, but instead limited her decisions regarding their child
custody, care, and control by prescribing a particular visitation time
45
with particular people. Troxel can therefore be read as establishing
that parental rights are implicated not only when the state flatly
prohibits certain conduct, but also when the state obstructs parental
46
decisionmaking.
B. Disagreement among the Circuits about the Proper Role of
Parental Rights with Respect to Sex-Ed
Although Supreme Court precedent clearly establishes parents’
right to control the moral and religious upbringing of their children,
federal circuit courts disagree as to whether the Meyer-Pierce right
retains any vitality once children cross the public schoolhouse door.
This Section examines several federal circuit court decisions that
illustrate the nebulous nature of parental rights in the context of
public schools’ sex-ed programs. Whereas the First and Ninth Circuits
construe parental rights very narrowly, the Third Circuit offers an
expansive view.
1. “Keep Out”: Parents’ Rights Stop at the School’s Door. The
First and Ninth Circuits have adopted a limited view of parental

42. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion).
43. Id. at 65.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 72; see also Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 306 (3d Cir. 2000) (recognizing that
parental rights are implicated not only in the face of proscriptions but also when the state limits
parents’ options).
46. Several lower federal courts, however, have read Meyer and Pierce as merely a
constitutional limitation on situations involving flat prohibitions on parental conduct. E.g.,
Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1205–06 (9th Cir. 2005); Brown v. Hot, Sexy &
Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 533–34 (1st Cir. 1995); see also infra Part I.B.1.
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rights, holding that the Meyer-Pierce right is satisfied when parents
choose whether or not to enroll their children in public school.
47
In Fields v. Palmdale School District, parents of elementary
school children alleged that the administration of a psychological
48
harms survey to their children violated their parental rights. Among
other things, the survey asked the children how often they think
about having sex, touch their own “private parts,” and think about
49
touching “other people’s private parts.” Although the school sought
and obtained parental permission before administering the survey, it
neither conveyed the sexual nature of the survey nor offered parents
an opportunity to review it before consenting to their child’s
50
participation. The parents claimed that had they known about the
survey’s sexual nature, they would not have allowed their children to
51
participate.
In rejecting the parents’ claim, the Ninth Circuit expanded the
parameters of school authority at the expense of parental rights. The
court held that although parents have a “right to inform their children
when and as they wish on the subject of sex,” they cannot “prevent a
public school from providing its students with whatever information it
wishes to provide, sexual or otherwise, when and as the school
52
determines that it is appropriate to do so.” Parents and schools
therefore have equal authority to discuss sexual matters with children.
Noting the logistical and administrative difficulties of accommodating
53
parents’ moral and religious preferences, the court seemed chiefly
motivated by a broad understanding of school authority. Because
“education is not merely about teaching the basics of reading, writing,
54
55
and arithmetic” but also includes fostering children’s mental health,

47. Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2005).
48. Id. at 1203. The survey was administered to students in the first, third, and fifth grades.
Id. at 1201.
49. Id. at 1202. The sexual references included the following statements, among others:
“Touching my private parts too much;” “Thinking about having sex;” “Having sex feelings in
my body;” and “Can’t stop thinking about sex.” Id. at 1202 n.3 (presenting the comprehensive
list of references that gave rise to the lawsuit).
50. See id. at 1201 & n.1 (reproducing the language of the permission letter); id. at 1202 &
n.3 (reproducing the survey questions that contained references to sex).
51. Id. at 1202.
52. Id. at 1206.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1209.
55. Id.
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the court found that the survey fell within the school’s educational
56
mission.
In its narrowest sense, Fields means that parents and schools
have equal authority to introduce children to sexual matters. More
broadly, however, Fields stands for the proposition that parents, once
they enroll their children in public school, have exercised the full
57
extent of their constitutional rights. They relinquish their exclusive
right to direct their child’s upbringing and instead share that authority
with the state. If matters of mental health and sexuality are
appropriately within the state’s purview, then parents acquiesce to the
58
state teaching their children about such matters. Consistent with this
reasoning, the Ninth Circuit rejected the parents’ claim. The court
explained that when they chose to enroll their children in the
Palmdale School District, they also “chose” each decision that the
school would make regarding their child’s education, including its
59
decision to administer the challenged sex survey. The parents
60
therefore had no constitutional complaint.
Although the parents in Fields did not allege a free exercise
claim, it is unlikely that they would have fared any better if they had.
61
In a decision on which Fields relies heavily, the First Circuit rejected

56. Id. at 1211.
57. See id. at 1206 (“[O]nce parents make the choice as to which school their children will
attend, their fundamental right to control the education of their children is, at the least,
substantially diminished.”). The court’s original opinion states that “the Meyer-Pierce right does
not extend beyond the threshold of the school door.” Id. at 1207. The Ninth Circuit affirmed its
holding en banc but amended the opinion to delete that line. Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 447
F.3d 1187, 1190–91 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). That modification, however, seems more an effort
to placate public outcry, e.g., Andrew Trotter, House Criticizes Court’s School Sex-Survey
Ruling, EDUC. WEEK, Nov. 30, 2005, at 28, than a substantive alteration. The Ninth Circuit still
affirmed the rest of its Fields opinion, Fields, 447 F.3d at 1190, which strongly suggests that the
Meyer-Pierce right is vindicated when parents enroll their children in public school, see Fields,
427 F.3d at 1206–07 (noting the limits on judicial scrutiny once parents have chosen to send their
children to public school and “affirm[ing] that the Meyer-Pierce right does not extend beyond
the threshold of the [public] school door”).
58. See Fields, 427 F.3d at 1207 (“[W]hat Meyer-Pierce establishes is the right of parents to
be free from state interference with their choice of the educational forum itself, a choice that
ordinarily determines the type of education one’s child will receive. The School District’s design
and administration of the survey in no way interfered with that right.”).
59. Id. (“Indeed, it was only because the parents had selected the school they did that their
children were asked the questions to which the parents objected.”).
60. See id. at 1211 (“[P]arents are possessed of no constitutional right to prevent the public
schools from providing information on [matters of and relating to sex] to their students in any
forum or manner they select.”).
61. Id. at 1205.

BROWN IN FINAL FINAL.DOCFINAL FINAL

9/15/2009 8:09:57 PM

2009] PARENTAL OBJECTIONS TO SEX EDUCATION

119

62

a “hybrid” parental–free exercise claim. In Brown v. Hot, Sexy and
63
Safer Productions, parents challenged a public high school’s
64
assembly on AIDS awareness. The mandatory, ninety-minute
assembly consisted of “sexually explicit monologues” and “sexually
suggestive skits” in which students chosen from the audience
65
participated. After “[telling] the students that they were going to
have a ‘group sexual experience, with audience participation,’” the
instructor gave a sexually explicit presentation, using profanity,
advocating various forms of sexual behavior, and making sexual
66
comments about students. Although the school had a policy of
obtaining parental permission for any “instruction in human
sexuality,” it did not notify parents about the assembly or give them
67
an opportunity to excuse their children. The parents sued the school
district, alleging, among other claims, that the assembly violated their
free exercise rights and their right to direct and control the
68
upbringing of their children.
The court rejected the parents’ claim, holding that the MeyerPierce right is limited to parents’ choice of whether or not to send

62. The notion of hybrid rights comes from the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In holding that neutral laws of general applicability
trigger rational basis review in the face of free exercise challenges, id. at 879–80, the Court
distinguished prior cases in which it had applied strict scrutiny: “The only decisions in which we
have held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to
religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free
Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as . . . the right of
parents . . . to direct the education of their children.” Id. at 881 (citation omitted). This “hybrid
rights” doctrine has produced much confusion among the circuits. See, e.g., Lechliter, supra note
24, at 2222–34 (discussing the three approaches to hybrid rights claims that have been adopted
by the circuit courts).
63. Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995).
64. Id. at 529.
65. Id.
66. Id. (“Specifically, the complaint alleges that Landolphi: 1) told the students that they
were going to have a ‘group sexual experience, with audience participation’; 2) used profane,
lewd, and lascivious language to describe body parts and excretory functions; 3) advocated and
approved oral sex, masturbation, homosexual sexual activity, and condom use during
promiscuous premarital sex; 4) simulated masturbation; 5) characterized the loose pants worn
by one minor as ‘erection wear’; 6) referred to being in ‘deep sh–’ after anal sex; 7) had a male
minor lick an oversized condom with her, after which she had a female minor pull it over the
male minor’s entire head and blow it up; 8) encouraged a male minor to display his ‘orgasm
face’ with her for the camera; 9) informed a male minor that he was not having enough orgasms;
10) closely inspected a minor and told him he had a ‘nice butt’; and 11) made eighteen
references to orgasms, six references to male genitals, and eight references to female genitals.”).
67. Id. at 530.
68. Id.
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69

their children to public school. It grounded its holding in the
logistical ramifications of a free-sweeping right to dictate public
school curricula, which the court feared would force schools “to cater
a curriculum for each student whose parents had genuine moral
70
disagreements with the school’s choice of subject matter.”
71
The court also rejected the parents’ free exercise challenge. In
its hybrid rights analysis, the court required that the free exercise
claim be conjoined with an independently viable constitutional
72
claim —an approach reflecting the most stringent construction of
73
hybrid rights. The court dismissed the parents’ free exercise claim on
two grounds: first, because it was not conjoined with an
independently viable constitutional claim, and second, because the
parents did not allege that the program “threatened their entire way
74
of life.” This requirement is somewhat bizarre given that Supreme
Court precedent does not require that a claimant’s entire way of life
75
be threatened to trigger the free exercise clause’s protections.
Brown and Fields significantly restrict the scope of parental
rights. Although it is unremarkable that parents do not have the right
to dictate public schools’ curricula, those plaintiffs sought
considerably narrower relief. In each instance, the parents objected to
76
a discrete activity or event. They did not endeavor to force the
school to teach their own views; rather, they requested only advance

69. See id. at 533 (“The Meyer and Pierce cases, we think, evince the principle that the state
cannot prevent parents from choosing a specific educational program . . . . We do not think,
however, that this freedom encompasses a fundamental constitutional right to dictate the
curriculum at the public school to which they have chosen to send their children.”).
70. See id. at 534 (rejecting parents’ right to “dictate” the public school curriculum of the
school their child attends).
71. Id. at 539.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Lechliter, supra note 24, at 2222–34 (discussing the three approaches to hybrid
rights claims that have been adopted among the circuit courts).
74. Brown, 68 F.3d at 539.
75. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886–87 (1990) (“It is no more appropriate
for judges to determine the ‘centrality’ of religious beliefs before applying a ‘compelling
interest’ test in the free exercise field, than it would be for them to determine the ‘importance’
of ideas before applying the ‘compelling interest’ test in the free speech field.”).
76. In Brown, the parents objected to a single, ninety-minute assembly. Brown, 68 F.3d at
529. In Fields, the survey lasted one hour. See Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1201
n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The assessment will consist of three, twenty-minute self-report measures,
which will be given to your child on one day during the last week of January.”).
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77

notice and an opportunity to exempt their children. Like the parents
78
in Mozert, they sought to be both insiders and outsiders.
2. “Parents Welcome”: Absent a Compelling State Interest,
Parents’ Decisions Prevail. Other circuits have rejected the First and
Ninth Circuits’ view that parental rights do not extend to the public
79
school setting. Most notably, the Third Circuit has affirmed a robust
view of parental rights by requiring schools to yield to parental
80
authority absent a compelling state interest.
81
In Gruenke v. Seip, a high school swimming coach allegedly
pressured a student to take a pregnancy test after observing that she
82
had decreased energy and poor performance at practice. The coach
discussed the results of the test with other members of the school
83
community, but not with the student’s parents. In holding that the
school had violated the parents’ right to direct their child’s
upbringing, the court affirmed that certain spheres—including moral
and religious education—are the exclusive province of parents. The
court wrote:
It is not educators, but parents, who have primary
upbringing of children. School officials have only
responsibility and must respect these rights. State
parental control over children is underscored by

rights in the
a secondary
deference to
the Court’s

77. These requests would impose, at most, a de minimis burden on schools. In Brown, the
school had a policy of notification and exemption that it failed to follow in the situation giving
rise to the parents’ claims, Brown, 68 F.3d at 530, so the policy is presumptively not
burdensome. In Fields, the parents were given inadequate notice. See Fields, 427 F.3d at 1201
(“The letter did not explicitly state that some questions involved sexual topics . . . .”).
78. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 395 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[T]his
right [to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children] plainly extends to the public
school setting . . . .”); Arnold v. Bd. of Educ., 880 F.2d 305, 312–13 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that
a public school violated parents’ constitutional right to direct their child’s moral and religious
upbringing when the school prevented a minor couple from consulting with their parents about
the decision to obtain an abortion); Rhoades v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 574 F. Supp.
2d 888, 898 (N.D. Ind. 2008) (“This court agrees with C.N. that the approach in Fields would gut
parental rights on the issue of education of any content other than choosing a school.”); Scheck
v. Baileyville Sch. Comm., 530 F. Supp. 679, 688 (D. Me. 1982) (“Parents do not surrender their
right to ‘control the education of their own [children]’ by enrolling them in public school, except
to the extent that the prescribed curriculum serves legitimate educational purposes.” (alteration
in original) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923))).
80. Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 305 (3d Cir. 2000).
81. Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 2000).
82. Id. at 295–96.
83. Id. at 297.
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admonitions that “the child is not the mere creature of the State,”
and that it is the parents’ responsibility to inculcate “moral
84
standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship.”

According to the Third Circuit, the parental right does not wane
when parents decide to enroll their children in public school. Public
school officials do retain legitimate authority to impose standards on
students’ conduct to “maintain order and a proper educational
85
atmosphere.” But when there is a conflict, the Third Circuit affords
deference to parental rights rather than to school policies:
It is not unforeseeable . . . that a school’s policies might come into
conflict with the fundamental right of parents to raise and nurture
their child. But when such collisions occur, the primacy of the
parents’ authority must be recognized and should yield only where
86
the school’s action is tied to a compelling interest.

Although Gruenke apparently strengthens parental rights claims,
87
its ultimate influence remains to be seen. Gruenke presents
particularly unusual facts that are likely to be easily distinguishable
from future cases. Coercing a student to take a pregnancy test and
then widely discussing the results is damaging to a child in a way that
88
a mandatory assembly or survey is not. Indeed, in its rejection of a
parental rights challenge to a sex survey, the Third Circuit
89
distinguished Gruenke based on its uniquely egregious facts.
90
In C.N. v. Ridgewood Board of Education, parents challenged a
91
survey given to middle and high school students. Although the
school notified parents of the survey and provided parents an
92
opportunity to review its content, the parents sued because the
school administered the survey in a manner that suggested to students

84. Id. at 307 (citations omitted).
85. Id. at 304.
86. Id. at 305.
87. See generally Robert Kubica, Issues in the Third Circuit, Let’s Talk About Sex: School
Surveys and Parents’ Fundamental Right to Make Decisions Concerning the Upbringing of Their
Children, 51 VILL. L. REV. 1085, 1104 (2006) (arguing that the Third Circuit typically favors
schools in parental rights cases).
88. This is true if only because a child is especially vulnerable when facing an unexpected
pregnancy.
89. C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 185 (3d Cir. 2005).
90. C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2005).
91. Id. at 161.
92. Id. at 164.
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93

that it was mandatory. The court rejected the parents’ claim, finding
94
that it fell short of the constitutional violation in Gruenke. Given
that the survey was voluntary and parents were notified, this holding
is unsurprising. The C.N. court did, however, reiterate that parents
occupy a unique sphere of authority into which schools cannot
95
encroach and explicitly rejected the narrow view of parental rights
96
adopted by the First and Ninth Circuits. Because the court found no
97
constitutional violation in C.N., the real bite of Gruenke remains to
be seen.
Nevertheless, Gruenke likely has implications beyond its unique
facts. The court relied heavily on the finding that the coach’s actions
actually prevented the parents from dealing with their daughter’s
98
pregnancy discreetly. When schools introduce young children to
sexual matters or advocate sexual behaviors, they preempt parents’
decisions about when children should be introduced to those topics
(thereby limiting parents’ options for how to deal with matters
99
pertaining to sex). Moreover, the First or Ninth Circuits likely would
have decided Gruenke differently: under the rationale in Fields, a
school’s educational mission includes facilitating students’ health, and
100
providing pregnancy tests is reasonably related to that goal.
93. Although the survey was designed to be voluntary, id., there was a considerable degree
of ambiguity as to whether the survey was presented to students as a voluntary activity, id. at
175–76.
94. Id. at 185.
95. See id. at 185 n.26 (“[I]t is primarily the parents’ right to ‘inculcate moral standards,
religious beliefs and elements of good citizenship.’” (quoting Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 307
(3d Cir. 2000))).
96. Id. (“In reaching this conclusion, we do not hold, as did the panel in Fields v. Palmdale
School District, that the right of parents under the Meyer-Pierce rubric ‘does not extend beyond
the threshold of the school door.’” (quoting Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1207
(9th Cir. 2005))). Because the court in Fields so heavily relied on Brown, Fields v. Palmdale Sch.
Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1205 (9th Cir. 2005), the C.N. court’s explicit rejection of Fields is
tantamount to a rejection of Brown as well.
97. C.N., 430 F.3d at 185.
98. Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 306 (3d Cir. 2000).
99. See C.N., 430 F.3d at 185 (“We recognize that introducing a child to sensitive topics
before a parent might have done so herself can complicate and even undermine parental
authority . . . .”); Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 307 (“School-sponsored counseling and psychological
testing that pry into private family activities can overstep the boundaries of school authority and
impermissibly usurp the fundamental rights of parents to bring up their children . . . .”); see also
Tara Dahl, Surveys in America’s Classrooms: How Much Do Parents Really Know?, 37 J.L. &
EDUC. 143, 190 (2008) (suggesting that the plaintiff parents in Fields could have prevailed on
their claim under the rationale in Gruenke).
100. Particularly when, as in Gruenke, the coach’s action was motivated by concern over the
swimmer’s performance, Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 295–96, the pregnancy test can be considered
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Unlike the constricted view of rights in the First and Ninth
Circuits, the Third Circuit recognizes that parental rights extend
beyond the decision to enroll children in public school. The essential
conflict that these cases reveal is whether or not there is a province
that uniquely belongs to parents, allowing them to tell a public school
to “keep out.”
II. PARENTS’ FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND SEX-ED
The Supreme Court has recognized that although public
education rests largely in the hands of state and local authorities,
courts may appropriately step in when constitutional rights are
101
implicated. The scope of parents’ right to direct their children’s
education and to control their moral and religious upbringing is
crucial to understanding the merits of constitutional challenges to sexed programs. This Part argues that parents’ fundamental right to
direct their children’s moral and educational upbringing includes the
right to decide when and how to introduce them to topics of sexuality.
When parents allege that this right has been violated, their claim
should trigger strict scrutiny review.
A. The Parental Right Encompasses Sex-Ed
Because views of sexuality are often inextricably linked to one’s
102
moral or religious beliefs, parents’ fundamental right to direct their

reasonably related to the school’s educational mission. There may, however, be a meaningful
distinction between situations like those in Brown and Fields, which involve a generally
applicable program that incidentally infringes on parental rights, and situations like that in
Gruenke, which involve specific, targeted treatment of an individual student. Cf. Arcara v.
Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 704–05 (1986) (holding that a generally applicable public health
regulation does not implicate the First Amendment when its effects on speech are merely
incidental). But see infra Part II.B.
101. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (“By and large, public education in
our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities. Courts do not and cannot
intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems and
which do not directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values.”). When constitutional
rights are implicated, courts have been willing to step in and dictate certain aspects of public
schools’ curricula. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871–72 (1982) (holding that
school boards cannot remove books from the school library based on disagreement with the
ideas they contain); Epperson, 393 U.S. at 109 (holding unconstitutional a prohibition against
teaching evolution in public schools).
102. E.g., Naomi Rivkind Shatz, Note, Unconstitutional Entanglements: The Religious Right,
the Federal Government, and Abstinence Education in the Schools, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
495, 524–30 (2008).
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children’s upbringing should encompass their right to direct their
children’s exposure to sexual topics.
In Fields and Brown, the courts rejected the parents’ claims as
103
beyond the scope of Fourteenth Amendment rights. By confining
Supreme Court precedent to situations involving flat prohibitions on
104
parental conduct, the courts distinguished the claims at issue in
Fields and Brown because parents were not altogether prevented from
105
talking to their children about sex. The Supreme Court’s decision in
Troxel, discussed in Part I.A, undermines this narrow construction of
106
parental rights. Although sex-ed does not affirmatively prohibit
107
parental teaching about sex, it does “obstruct” the parental right to
decide how and when to discuss sexual issues. Sexual behavior and
sexuality are controversial topics, and religious beliefs often shape
108
individual views in these areas. A school’s unrestricted ability to
introduce children to the topic of sex without parental notification or
consent effectively preempts and usurps a parent’s discretion as to
109
when and how to discuss sex.
Many courts and commentators doubt that a school’s authority
to teach children about sex without parental notice or consent
110
unconstitutionally burdens parental rights. After all, children are
exposed to sexual matters through a multitude of sources, including
111
classmates, television, advertising, and music. Given these realities,
103. Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1205 (9th Cir. 2005); Brown v. Hot, Sexy &
Safer Prods., 68 F.3d 525, 534 (1st Cir. 1995).
104. Fields, 427 F.3d at 1205; Brown, 68 F.3d at 533–34.
105. See Fields, 427 F.3d at 1206 (“Parents have a right to inform their children when and as
they wish on the subject of sex . . . .”); Brown, 68 F.3d at 534 (noting that the parents’ claim was
not based on any flat prohibition).
106. See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text.
107. Cf. Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 306 (3d Cir. 2000) (discussing the allegation that a
school counselor’s conduct, which led to negative publicity, obstructed the plaintiff parent’s
right to address her daughter’s pregnancy).
108. E.g., Shatz, supra note 102, at 524–30.
109. Especially in the elementary school context, parents may decide not to introduce the
topic of sex until their children are older. If a school has a unilateral right to teach children
about sex, however, then it can preempt parents’ decisions about when to initiate any
discussions about sexuality.
110. E.g., C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 185 (3rd Cir. 2005); Brough, supra
note 24, at 413.
111. E.g., C.N., 430 F.3d at 185 (“[A] myriad of influences surround middle and high school
students everyday, many of which are beyond the strict control of the parent or even abhorrent
to the parent.”); Laura A. Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 841–
46 (2007). See generally DIANE E. LEVIN & JEAN KILBURNE, SO SEXY SO SOON: THE NEW
SEXUALIZED CHILDHOOD AND WHAT PARENTS CAN DO TO PROTECT THEIR KIDS (2008)
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a school’s contributions to otherwise widely accessible sexual
information may have little marginal effect on parental rights.
There are two flaws in this argument. First, there is a distinction
between the incidental, endemic difficulties of childrearing and an
affirmative state power to interfere. No other realm of civil rights
acquiesces to government violations simply because “everyone else is
doing it.” The fact that people in society may espouse racist views, for
instance, does not render the state’s espousal of racism insignificant.
Second, because a public school’s instruction on sexuality carries the
imprimatur of the state, it is uniquely authoritative—at least more so
112
than the general cultural milieu.
The Supreme Court has
consistently accounted for the impressionability of young children in
113
the Establishment Clause context, and it would be inconsistent to
deny that impressionability when it comes to sex-ed.
A related argument is that public schools routinely limit parents’
right to control their children through various administrative
requirements, such as the hours in a school day, curriculum decisions,
114
and school dress code policies. These types of restrictions are
115
routinely upheld; indeed, without them, schools’ educational role
116
would be handicapped by insurmountable administrative burdens.
In Fields, the Ninth Circuit viewed the challenged survey as
analogous to these types of school requirements and thus found
117
parental objections similarly meritless.
One must pause, however, and consider whether all parental
rights claims are equal, especially in terms of the nature of the alleged
118
violation. In Blau v. Fort Thomas Public School District, the Sixth
(demonstrating that children are being sexualized at increasingly young ages and lamenting the
adverse consequences).
112. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 883 (2004) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (“In the marketplace of ideas, the government has vast resources and special
status.”).
113. E.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S 577, 592 (1992).
114. E.g., Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1204–05 (9th Cir. 2005).
115. E.g., Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 385 (6th Cir. 2005) (mandatory
dress code); Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 291 (5th Cir. 2001) (mandatory
uniform policy); Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-L, 135 F.3d 694, 696 (10th Cir.
1998) (mandatory full-time attendance policy); Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of
Educ., 89 F.3d 174, 176 (4th Cir. 1996) (mandatory community service requirements).
116. For a discussion of the argument that parental rights can sometimes appropriately
handicap the educational role of schools, see infra Part III.C.
117. See Fields, 427 F.3d at 1207 (relying in part on Blau to conclude that a parent’s MeyerPierce rights do not extend beyond the choice to enroll one’s child in public school).
118. Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2005).
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Circuit upheld a public high school’s dress code against a parental
119
rights claim. The parents’ claim in this case was essentially that they
120
had a fundamental right to let their child wear whatever she wanted.
This asserted right is an attenuated leap from well-established
parental rights, namely the right to direct the upbringing of one’s
121
children.
Perhaps the Fields court overlooked a meaningful
difference between a fashion faux pas and conscientious objections.
One commentator raised exactly this point:
Implicitly, the [Fields] court equates an alleged right to exempt a
child from a dress code with an alleged right to prevent seven-yearolds from taking a sexually laden survey. Though blue jeans might
be stylish and comfortable, the parental interest in a child’s ability to
wear them does not offer a “flattering analogy” to the much more
122
compelling interest in shielding a child from sexual content.

In contrast to challenges to public school administrative
guidelines, a parent’s role in guiding a child’s decisions is stronger
when moral and religious precepts are at stake. Society wants parents
123
to fulfill their role as moral tutors. Moreover, the consequences of
granting an exemption are entirely different in the dress code context,
when an exemption would foil the policy’s very purpose—
124
uniformity—and impair its benefits. In contrast, exempting one
119. Id. at 395–96.
120. See id. at 389–90 (“[T]he Blaus have not met their burden of showing that the First
Amendment protects [their child’s] conduct—which in this instance amounts to nothing more
than a generalized and vague desire to express her middle-school individuality. . . . [T]he First
Amendment does not protect such vague and attenuated notions of expression—namely, selfexpression through any and all clothing that a 12-year old may wish to wear on a given day.”).
121. See id. at 393–94 (“The list of fundamental rights . . . does not include the wearing of
dungarees . . . . Nor do the fundamental rights that the Court has recognized offer a flattering
analogy to [the] claim [to wear blue jeans]. Whether it be the right to marry, the right to have
children, the right to direct the educational upbringing of one’s child, the right to marital privacy,
the right to use contraception, the right to bodily integrity, or the right to abortion, none of
these fundamental rights has much, if anything, in common with the right to wear blue jeans.”
(citations omitted) (second emphasis added)); Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d
275, 289 (5th Cir. 2001) (“The fundamental right of filiation and companionship with one’s
children, which the Supreme Court examined in Troxel, is an entirely different balance of
interests from the right of parents to send their children to a public school in clothes of their
own choosing.” (quoting Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 108 F. Supp. 2d 681, 702 (N.D.
Tex. 2000))).
122. Davis, supra note 24, at 1140.
123. See infra notes 142–46 and accompanying text.
124. The purposes of a dress code are to create unity, strengthen school spirit, minimize
distractions, enhance safety, promote good behavior, reduce discipline problems, and bridge
socioeconomic gaps. E.g., Blau, 401 F.3d at 385. Allowing even one student to deviate from the
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student from a sex-ed program does not undermine the school’s
125
purpose with respect to the other students.
There is thus a strong argument that parents’ constitutional right
to direct their children’s upbringing includes the right to decide when
and how their children will learn about sexual matters. A school’s
decision to teach children about sex burdens that right.
B. Parental Rights Claims Merit Strict Scrutiny
The Supreme Court explicitly has christened as “fundamental”
parents’ rights to direct the education and religious and moral
126
upbringing of their children. Fundamental rights typically trigger
127
strict scrutiny review, yet the Supreme Court has never been clear
about the level of scrutiny it applies to parental rights. In its earliest
parental rights cases, the Court apparently applied rational basis
128
review. But in Troxel, the Court implies that parental rights to
control their children’s upbringing trigger some level of heightened

dress code would at least undermine the school’s goals of minimizing distractions and bridging
socioeconomic problems. But see Littlefield, 268 F.3d at 293 (describing a school district’s
provision allowing parents to opt their children out of the uniform requirement if they had a
bona fide religious or philosophical objection).
125. See infra Part III.C. But see Parker v. Hurley, 474 F. Supp. 2d 261, 265 (D. Mass. 2007),
aff’d, 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008) (“An exodus from class when issues of homosexuality or samesex marriage are to be discussed could send the message that gays, lesbians, and the children of
same-sex parents are inferior and, therefore, have a damaging effect on those students. It might
also undermine the [school officials’] efforts to educate the remaining other students to
understand and respect differences in sexual orientation.” (citation omitted)); Yuval SimchiLevi, Note, Amending the Massachusetts Parental Notification Statute, 14 CARDOZO J.L. &
GENDER 759, 776–79 (2008) (presenting social science data demonstrating the detrimental
effects of intolerance on gay, lesbian, and transgender youth and arguing that education on
sexual diversity in public schools benefits sexual minorities).
126. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (“In a long line of cases,
we have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the
‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right[] . . . to direct the education and
upbringing of one’s children.”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (labeling “the
traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children” as
“fundamental”); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality opinion) (“[I]t
cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the
fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of
their children.”).
127. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721.
128. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (“[T]he statute as applied is arbitrary
and without reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the State.”). Under
rational basis review, a statute need only bear “a reasonable relation to a legitimate state
interest.” E.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722.
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scrutiny. Although the circuits are divided on the issue, the
traditional application of strict scrutiny protection, coupled with
Troxel, strongly supports strict scrutiny—or at the very least,
131
heightened review—of infringements of parental rights.
Parents’ rights in the context of public school sex-ed fall within
the rationale behind strict scrutiny protection. Courts typically apply
strict scrutiny in two instances: when fundamental rights are at stake,
or when there is a special concern that certain minorities are
132
vulnerable to government oppression. In both instances, strict
scrutiny protects citizens by “plac[ing] the matter outside the arena of
133
public debate and legislative action.” But because the Court is
hesitant to extend the parameters of heightened constitutional
134
protection, it has outlined additional considerations for applying
strict scrutiny. The Court primarily looks to whether the fundamental
129. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (plurality opinion) (explaining “heightened protection [for]
certain fundamental rights and liberty interests” and then labeling the parental interest in the
care, custody, and control of children as a “fundamental liberty interest[]”); id. at 80 (Thomas,
J., concurring) (“The opinions of the plurality, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Souter recognize
[parents’ constitutional right to determine who will educate and socialize their children], but
curiously none of them articulates the appropriate standard of review. I would apply strict
scrutiny to infringements of fundamental rights.”); Good, supra note 24, at 658–59 (“[G]iven the
plurality opinion, coupled with Justice Thomas’s concurrence [applying strict scrutiny]—at least
five of the Justices favor at least intermediate scrutiny when a fundamental parental right is at
issue.”).
130. Compare Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 305 (3d Cir. 2000) (requiring the school’s
infringing action to be “tied to a compelling interest”), with Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods.,
68 F.3d 525, 533 n.5 (1st Cir. 1995) (“[T]he [Meyer and Pierce] opinions indicate that something
less than the current ‘compelling state interest’ test was then used to evaluate a substantive due
process challenge involving one of the listed liberty interests . . . .”). Although Brown was
decided before Troxel, the First Circuit’s analysis in subsequent cases suggests that it does not
read Troxel to require strict scrutiny review of parental rights claims. See, e.g., Parker v. Hurley,
514 F.3d 87, 101 (1st Cir. 2008) (“The Troxel plurality did not . . . specifically address which
standard of review to apply when this due process right is implicated.”).
131. See Good, supra note 24, at 660 (“The question is not whether a heightened standard of
review should apply but which heightened form applies: intermediate or strict scrutiny.
Presumably strict scrutiny should apply, but at the very least, intermediate scrutiny should be
used.”).
132. E.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719–22; JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:
A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 73–104 (1980); see also United States v. Carolene Prods., 304
U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of [] political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry.”); LUCAS A. POWE JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 488
(2000) (“Footnote Four was designed in part to protect religious dissenters, not mainstream
religions.”).
133. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.
134. E.g., id.
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right is (1) “deeply rooted in [the] Nation’s history and tradition”
and (2) “‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ such that ‘neither
136
liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed.’”
Parents’ right to direct their children’s education and moral
137
training satisfies these two criteria. There is a long tradition
supporting parental rights and the duty of parents to care for their
children. Blackstone described the parent-child relationship as one of
138
the “most universal . . . in nature.”
Of all parental duties,
Blackstone believed that the duty to educate one’s children was
139
uniquely important. Indeed, it is the only duty that he thought the
140
state should proactively encourage parents to fulfill. After tracing
the development of parental rights over two thousand years,
Professor Eric A. DeGroff concludes that “to suggest these values are
‘deeply rooted in [the] Nation’s history and tradition,’ are ‘basic
values that underlie our society,’ and reflect legal rights that have
been ‘traditionally protected by our society’ would be, if anything, an
141
understatement.”
Parents’ right to control their children’s moral and educational
upbringing also satisfies the Court’s second requirement. Parental
142
care is indispensable to the health of a liberal democracy. Professor
DeGroff argues:
It is difficult to imagine anything more destructive of liberty than a
government with the authority to override parental choices
concerning the development and values of the next generation—
particularly religious or moral values. One of the keys to
maintaining American democratic institutions has been the freedom

135. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (quoting Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 503 (1977)), overruled on other grounds by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
136. Id. at 191–92 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937)).
137. Eric A. DeGroff, Parental Rights and Public School Curricula: Revisiting Mozert After
20 Years, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 83, 108–28 (2009).
138. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *446.
139. Id. at *450–51 (“The last duty of parents to their children is that of giving them an
education suitable to their station in life: a duty pointed out by reason, and of far the greatest
importance of any.”).
140. See id. at *451 (“Yet the municipal laws of most countries seem to be defective in this
point, by not constraining the parent to bestow a proper education upon his children.”).
141. DeGroff, supra note 137, at 124 (footnotes omitted).
142. See Richard W. Garnett, Taking Pierce Seriously: The Family, Religious Education, and
Harm to Children, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 120–22 (2000) (arguing that parental oversight
of children’s education and development is indispensable to the continuation of a liberal
republic).
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of diverse families to choose for themselves what values to hold and
143
what course to follow.

Because parents have the primary responsibility for raising and
educating their children, they are in some sense guardians of the
144
republic.
It is therefore both natural—from a biological
perspective—and beneficial—from a social capital perspective—for
145
parents to educate their children. This firmly rooted tradition is
bolstered by the vast body of contemporary social science research
showing that parents generally act in their children’s best interests
146
and can (and should) be entrusted with their primary care.
The parental right to direct a child’s moral and religious
upbringing is especially deserving of strict scrutiny. This facet of
parental rights necessarily implicates the free exercise clause, in
addition to substantive due process, because these claims are
147
inescapably hybrid. In Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme
Court noted that strict scrutiny is appropriate for “hybrid claims,” in
which free exercise claims are conjoined with other fundamental
148
rights to challenge a neutral and generally applicable law.
Smith’s hybrid rights language has generated considerable
149
confusion, controversy, and commentary among the circuits.
Though legitimate ambiguity surrounds the scope and application of
hybrid rights, Smith unambiguously affirms the concept of hybrid
rights set forth in Wisconsin v. Yoder. In Yoder, the court demanded
more than a rational basis—and, indeed, arguably applied strict

143. DeGroff, supra note 137, at 126–27.
144. Garnett, supra note 142, at 120–22.
145. Moreover, parents are in the best position to educate children. Professor Stephen G.
Gilles argues that the state’s incentive to act according to its conception of children’s best
interests is significantly lower than parents’ incentives to act according to their conception of
their child’s interest. Because parents are more likely to effectively raise their children,
according to Gilles, the state has an interest in protecting and respecting parental autonomy.
Gilles, supra note 24, at 953–55.
146. See generally id. (citing legal, economic, and social science data supporting the claim
that parents are properly entrusted with their children’s care).
147. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
148. See id. at 881 n.1 (“[W]hen the interests of parenthood are combined with a free
exercise claim of the nature revealed by this record, more than merely a reasonable relation to
some purpose within the competency of the State is required . . . .” (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
149. See, e.g., Good, supra note 24, at 662–74 (presenting and discussing the circuits’ divided
approach to hybrid rights claims); Lechliter, supra note 24, at 2222–34 (outlining and
categorizing the circuit split regarding hybrid rights).
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150

scrutiny —for the state’s violation of Amish parents’ right to direct
151
the religious upbringing of their children. Smith did not overrule
Yoder but instead specifically preserved it. Professor Heather M.
Good explains:
The hybrid rights doctrine was created in Smith precisely for the
purpose of distinguishing, not overruling, earlier precedent. Thus,
while Smith requires a rational basis test in most situations, it
implicitly requires a separate test, some form of heightened review,
for hybrid situations. In articulating a bright-line rule, the Court did
not overrule previous precedent. Rather, the Court made explicitly
clear that its previous free exercise jurisprudence remained in
152
force.

Whatever its other implications, Smith’s hybrid claims language
preserves Yoder’s heightened scrutiny as the applicable standard for
parents’ right to direct their children’s moral and religious upbringing.
153
Although circuits may disagree about the contours of hybrid rights,
they cannot reasonably disagree that a parental right claim conjoined
with a free exercise claim merits heightened scrutiny. These
considerations, in addition to the fact that parents’ right to direct their
children’s moral and educational upbringing satisfies the Court’s
154
traditional criteria for applying strict scrutiny, strongly support the
155
contention that this right merits strict scrutiny review.
III. ANALYZING PARENTAL OBJECTIONS TO SEX-ED
In Yoder, the Supreme Court arrived at its decision by balancing
156
the competing interests of the Amish parents and the state. Because
Yoder represents the Supreme Court’s most comprehensive analysis

150. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (“[W]e must searchingly examine the
interests that the State seeks to promote by its requirement for compulsory education . . . .”).
151. See id. at 233 (“[W]hen the interests of parenthood are combined with a free exercise
claim . . . more than merely a ‘reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the
State’ is required to sustain the validity of the State’s requirement under the First
Amendment.”).
152. Good, supra note 24, at 655.
153. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 132–46 and accompanying text.
155. Because strict scrutiny permits the government to justify actions with a compelling
interest, heightened review will not remove all limits on parental authority. At a minimum, a
compelling interest is implicated if parents physically harm their children, regardless of their
motivation (religious or otherwise). Garnett, supra note 142, at 137–38.
156. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214–29.
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157

of parental rights claims in the context of education, its analytical
framework is useful for understanding how constitutional law should
treat parents’ right to direct their children’s moral and religious
158
upbringing in the context of public education. Rather than inspiring
judicial discretion, however, Yoder more appropriately informs the
development of a bright-line rule in favor of granting parental
159
exemptions. The bright-line rule that follows from Yoder is that
parents are entitled to exemptions when they object to discrete
programs or activities in public schools. This Part develops that rule
by applying the factors set forth in Yoder to sex-ed disputes.
Section A addresses the nature of parents’ interests in the face of
public school sex-ed programs. Section B then discusses the state’s
interest in providing such information and denying exemptions.
Finally, Section C analyzes the likely ramifications of constitutionally
required exemptions.
A. The Yoder Framework
Yoder involved a challenge brought by Amish parents against
160
Wisconsin’s compulsory education law. In evaluating the parents’
claim, the court promulgated a balancing test that weighed both

157. See Daniel J. Rose, Note, Compulsory Education and Parent Rights: A Judicial
Framework of Analysis, 30 B.C. L. REV. 861, 863 (1989) (noting that Yoder represents a
balancing framework used by the Supreme Court to analyze education conflicts); cf. Crystal V.
Hodgson, Note, Coercion in the Classroom: The Inherent Tension Between the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses in the Context of Evolution, 9 NEXUS 171, 182 (2004) (arguing that
Yoder provides an apt framework for evaluating parental objections to evolution curricula in
public schools). Compare Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213–36 (employing an extended balancing test that
measures parental interests against social interests), with Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534–36 (1925) (discussing parental rights at significantly less length with less painstaking focus
on balancing parental and social interests), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–403
(1923) (same).
158. Although the Amish parents brought a Free Exercise claim rather than a Fourteenth
Amendment parental rights claim, the Court’s analysis is applicable because it has since
construed Yoder as a hybrid claim in which the Free Exercise clause and parental rights worked
in tandem. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990). Moreover, because the
Court applied heightened review in Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221, its analysis is applicable to parents’
fundamental rights, which at the very least trigger heightened review, if not strict scrutiny, see
supra Part II.B.
159. Because balancing tests confer discretion and spawn unpredictability, a bright-line rule
more fully comports with the goals of fairness, efficiency, and predictability. See generally
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989) (arguing
that courts should apply bright-line rules rather than discretionary tests).
160. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207.
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161

parental and state interests. The Court also reflected upon the
162
nature and implications of the requested relief. In granting the
Amish an exemption, the Court noted that “there is at best a
speculative gain, in terms of meeting the duties of citizenship, from an
163
additional one or two years of compulsory formal education.”
The Court granted the exemption not only because it would not
undermine the state’s interest; it also implicitly furthered that
164
interest. The Amish children received an education, and the
exemption did not hamper the state’s administration of public
schools. After all, the state does not have an interest in being the
165
exclusive provider of education. Rather, the state’s interest is more
appropriately described as enabling parents to provide for their
children’s education—by either providing public schools or
permitting parents to use alternative education. Perhaps, therefore,
state and parental interests coincide more than would initially
166
appear.
B. Parents’ Interests
Parents’ interest in their children’s moral and religious
upbringing is significantly compromised if public schools have
unilateral authority to introduce young children to and teach them
167
about sex. First, this authority usurps parents’ ability to decide when

161. Id. at 214–29.
162. Id. at 227.
163. Id.; see also id. at 234 (“The record strongly indicates that accommodating the religious
objections of the Amish by forgoing one, or at most two, additional years of compulsory
education will not impair the physical or mental health of the child, or result in an inability to be
self-supporting or to discharge the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, or in any other way
materially detract from the welfare of society.”).
164. Id. at 223–26.
165. Id. at 226 n.14 (“While Jefferson recognized that education was essential to the welfare
and liberty of the people, he was reluctant to directly force instruction of children ‘in opposition
to the will of the parent.’” (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph Cabell, Sept. 19,
1817, in 17 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 417, 423–24 (Mem. ed. 1904))); see also Pierce v.
Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (“The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all
governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its
children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.”).
166. The vast amount of social science research that shows the beneficial value of parental
involvement in children’s lives also bolsters this assertion. See, e.g., Teresa Stanton Collett,
Protecting Our Daughters: The Need for the Vermont Parental Notification Law, 26 VT. L. REV.
101, 130 n.152 (2001) (noting that parental involvement can be used to curb teen sexual
activity).
167. See supra Part II.A.
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and how to discuss sex with their children. Second, when a school
advocates a particular message that conflicts with a parent’s message
at home, it undermines that parent’s ability to direct his child’s
upbringing. Messages with the government’s imprimatur carry
168
particular persuasiveness. Hearing divergent messages from parents
and teachers can be detrimentally confusing, especially for young
children. As Professor Emily Buss has noted:
We can trust adults to understand the difference between these
ceremonial references and more directive endorsements, because
our understanding of self, and state, and our relationship to the
state, has matured. Children’s immaturity, in contrast, makes them
far more vulnerable to a misapprehension of the state message.
Indeed, it is impossible to entirely disentangle their emerging
understanding of self from their interpretation of these messages
169
from the state.

C. State Interests
The state has an interest in educating its students to be
170
productive and engaged citizens. A school’s purview of authority
therefore extends beyond mere reading, writing, and arithmetic. To
that end, schools must retain some degree of autonomy to set and
171
administer a curriculum for effective education. The state’s interest

168. E.g., McCreary Co. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 883 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“In
the marketplace of ideas, the government has vast resources and special status.”); Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583–84 (1987); see also Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 100–01 (1st Cir.
2008) (“The impressionability of young school children has been noted as a relevant factor in
the Establishment Clause context. . . . We see no principled reason why the age of students
should be irrelevant in Free Exercise Clause cases.”).
169. Emily Buss, Allocating Developmental Control Among Parent, Child and the State, 2004
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 51.
170. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“Today, education is perhaps
the most important function of state and local governments. . . . [I]t is doubtful that any child
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.”);
see also, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) (“[P]ublic schools are vitally
important ‘in the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens,’ and as vehicles for
‘inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system.’”
(quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76–77 (1979))).
171. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) (“There is no doubt as to the
power of a State, having a high responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable
regulations for the control and duration of its basic education.”); Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch.
Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 395–96 (6th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that state and local authorities retain
control over public school curricula and issues relating to “how a public school teaches
[children]”).
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is therefore double-faceted and includes both effective administration
and the substantive content of educational materials.
The state’s interest in administrative efficiency is fairly
172
uncontroversial. To operate with any efficiency, a school’s decisions
cannot be subject to inexhaustible parental scrutiny and veto. The
fact that schools have general administrative authority, however, does
not constitute a compelling basis for encroaching on parental rights in
173
all situations. The nature of the interest in a given context is
therefore crucial: in other words, the relevant question is not whether
a state has administrative authority, but how much an exemption
would undermine that authority in a given situation.
The more complicated aspect of parental objections pertains to a
state’s interest in teaching the objectionable material. Twenty-one
states require public schools to educate their students about sexuality,
disease prevention, or reproduction, and ten states permit (but do not
174
require) such instruction. Given the rise of sexually transmitted
175
diseases among American youth, the state has a public health
interest in ensuring that citizens know about sex and disease
176
prevention. What is less clear, however, is whether this interest is
appropriately vindicated through the public school system and at the
expense of parental rights.

172. E.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213; Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923).
173. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221 (“Where fundamental claims of religious freedom are
at stake, however, we cannot accept such a sweeping claim [that a state’s interest in compulsory
education is compelling]; despite its admitted validity in the generality of cases, we must
searchingly examine the interests that the State seeks to promote by its requirement . . . and the
impediment to those objectives that would flow from recognizing the claimed Amish
exemption.”). Moreover, administrative efficiency arguments do not typically prevail in the face
of other civil rights claims. See, e.g., Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182,
192 (1999) (rejecting the government’s administrative efficiency defense in the context of voter
communication); United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 473 (1995)
(rejecting the government’s administrative efficiency defense to a free speech challenge). The
disparate deference afforded to administrative concerns in different contexts reflects a general
judicial disrespect for parental rights.
174. Simchi-Levi, supra note 125, at 770.
175. See Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, STD Surveillance 2006,
http://www.cdc.gov/std/stats06/adol.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2009) (“Recent estimates suggest
that while representing 25% of the ever sexually active population, 15 to 24 years of age acquire
nearly half of all new STDs.”).
176. E.g., Brough, supra note 24, at 411–12.
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Courts generally deem any interest within a school’s educational
177
mission legitimate. Courts should be cautious when second-guessing
178
a school’s determination of its educational mission, but those
determinations should not be accepted blindly. Because schools
articulate their own educational mission, their authority has no
ascertainable limit. Justice Alito has noted:
The “educational mission” of the public schools is defined by the
elected and appointed public officials with authority over the
schools and by the school administrators and faculty. As a result,
some public schools have defined their educational missions as
including the inculcation of whatever political and social views are
179
held by the members of these groups.

In his concurring opinion in Mozert, Judge Boggs highlighted
similar problems: “The school board recognizes no limitation on its
power to require any curriculum, no matter how offensive or onesided, and to expel those who will not study it, so long as it does not
180
violate the Establishment Clause.”
The cases discussed in Part I.C illustrate the line-drawing
problems caused by educational mission defenses. The Ninth Circuit
held that the psychological survey in Fields fell within the school’s
educational mission because it was related to protecting children’s
181
mental health. Whatever legitimate interest a state has in sex-ed is
considerably diminished when a school provides surveys or directs
182
information to young children. When students are in elementary

177. See, e.g., Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1210 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The
defendants argue that the survey was intended to gauge the mental health of the School
District’s students . . . . In this respect, the School District’s interest in the mental health of its
students falls well within the state’s authority as parens patriae. As such, the School District may
legitimately play a role in the care and nurture of children entrusted to them for schooling.”).
178. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235 (“[C]ourts are not school boards or legislatures, and are
ill-equipped to determine the ‘necessity’ of discrete aspects of a State’s program of compulsory
education.”).
179. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2637 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring). In Morse, the
Court rejected the school district’s argument that its censorship authority extended as far as its
educational mission. See id. (“The opinion of the Court does not endorse the broad argument
advanced by petitioners and the United States that the First Amendment permits public school
officials to censor any student speech that interferes with a school’s ‘educational mission.’”).
180. Mozert v. Hawkins Co. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1073 (6th Cir. 1987) (Boggs, J.,
concurring).
181. Fields, 427 F.3d at 1211.
182. This is because, in contrast to elementary school students, “sex education for
adolescents involves pupils who are in a position to put what they learn into practice.” Kenneth
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school, any benefits of compulsory sex-ed are considerably offset
when that education is provided over parents’ objections or without
183
their knowledge. And in the case of surveys like those at issue in
Fields and C.N., the student participants were not “learning” in any
184
traditional sense. The usual information flow is reversed when
185
children are providing information to their schools. In these
186
situations, the state’s educational interest is attenuated.
Given that parents and schools both have interests in providing
children with sex-ed, the relevant and decisive factor appears to be
the nature of the exemption and its effect on the school’s interest.
D. Granting Relief
The foregoing analysis is readily adaptable to cases in which
187
parents object to discrete activities or programs that undermine
their authority to direct the moral and religious upbringing of their
children by teaching them about sex. Parents’ interest in directing
their children’s moral and religious upbringing falls within the scope
of their Fourteenth Amendment rights. When parents object to
discrete activities or programs that are easily isolated from the rest of

L. Karst, Law, Cultural Conflict, and the Socialization of Children, 91 CAL. L. REV. 967, 997
(2003).
183. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. Moreover, requiring parental consent would
strengthen a school’s interest in sex-ed programs. It is rational and useful to involve parents in
sex-ed, and notifying parents—even those who would give consent readily—can only help
facilitate further discussion. See NAT’L GUIDELINES TASK FORCE, GUIDELINES FOR
COMPREHENSIVE SEXUALITY EDUCATION 20 (3d ed. 2004), available at http://www.siecus.
org/pubs/guidelines/guidelines.pdf (announcing, inter alia, the following values inherent in the
guidelines: “Parents should be the primary sexuality educators of their children”; “Families
should provide children’s first education about sexuality”; and “Families should share their
values about sexuality with their children”). Permitting parents to excuse their children is
unlikely to harm whatever pedagogical interest a school has in teaching elementary school
children about sex because the children will encounter the information at a later (and arguably
more appropriate) age.
184. See Fields, 427 F.3d at 1209–10 (“[T]he students who were questioned may or may not
have ‘learned’ anything from the survey itself and may or may not have been ‘taught’ anything
by the questions they were asked . . . .”).
185. Davis, supra note 24, at 1139–40.
186. The school’s interest in children’s mental health is at least a step removed from its
interest in teaching the core disciplines of reading, writing, and arithmetic.
187. Discrete activities and programs are easily isolated from the rest of the curriculum.
Some examples include surveys, assemblies, and sex-ed classes. When parents object to more
pervasive practices in the school, then the school’s burden in providing an exemption
correspondingly increases. See infra Part IV.
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the curriculum, they are constitutionally entitled to notice and an
188
opportunity to exempt their children.
This Note has discussed the interests of both parents and the
189
state. Parents have an interest in guiding their child’s moral and
religious development, and instruction on or exposure to sexual
matters implicates that interest. Schools also have an interest in
educating children about sexual health. But when parents request an
exemption, they do not necessarily undermine the school’s interest. If
parents truly are best equipped to facilitate children’s moral well190
being, then the state has an interest in enabling parents to direct
their children’s moral and religious upbringing. In these instances, as
in Yoder, an exemption would be especially appropriate.
191
Even if parent and state interests conflict, however, the de
minimis burden that exemptions entail justifies vindicating parental
192
interests. In cases involving objections to discrete events, the
193
school’s interest is slight. Parents in these cases have not requested
that their views be taught in the classroom, but only that they be
notified and given an opportunity to exempt their children. In cases
like Brown, in which the exemption applies only to a short assembly,
a school can hardly claim substantial administrative disruption if

188. Parental requests for notice have particularly strong constitutional backing because
they inherently implicate procedural due process concerns. Because procedural due process
requires notice and a hearing, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975), constitutional law
implicitly entitles parents to notice before public schools teach children about matters that
conflict with the parental province, cf. Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 584
(1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“‘[T]he protection of the individual against arbitrary
action . . . [is] the very essence of due process,’ but where the State is allowed to act secretly
behind closed doors and without any notice to those who are affected by its actions, there is no
check against the possibility of such arbitrary action.” (alterations and omission in original)
(citation omitted) (quoting Slochower v. Bd. of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 559 (1956) (internal
quotation marks omitted))). Practically, this would require a school to notify parents about its
curriculum and programs, which—in an era of ready access to information via the Internet—
should not pose a significant burden.
189. See supra Part III.B–C.
190. E.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944); Gilles, supra note 24, at 961–
65; see supra notes 142–46 and accompanying text.
191. Sex-ed programs in public schools are arguably a response to parents’ failure to
adequately educate their children about sex. Brough, supra note 24, at 410.
192. For example, in Brown, the school had a policy of notification and exemption which it
failed to follow in the situation giving rise to the parents’ claims, Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer
Prods., 68 F.3d 525, 530 (1st Cir. 1995), so the policy is presumptively not burdensome. See
supra note 173.
193. See supra notes 183–86 and accompanying text.
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194

parents excuse their children. A similarly slight burden arises when
surveys are at issue, as in C.N. and Fields. Even for multi-week health
195
classes, however, the school’s burden is minimal. There is no
196
financial burden, and any administrative burden is apparently small.
The greatest burden that a school can assert, therefore, is that
exemptions undermine its educational mission—which, as discussed,
197
is an inherently circumspect perimeter for authority.
Moreover, granting an exemption serves the broader purpose of
198
making public schools more hospitable to diverse viewpoints.
Although objecting parents are often viewed contemptuously as
intolerant naysayers, their objections are grounded in firmly held
religious and philosophical beliefs. It is ironic that schools would
prefer to abandon their mission of educating these children at all,
199
rather than to accommodate them in narrow and specific instances.
When parents’ only options are to subject their children to
objectionable lessons and information, or to remove their children
200
from public school, then they often face a Hobson’s choice.
Moreover, if these children are channeled into alternative educational
systems, then the majority loses an opportunity to engage minority

194. Indeed, in Brown, the school had a policy requiring notification and an opportunity for
exemption but failed to follow that policy in the situation giving rise to the claim. Brown, 68
F.3d at 530.
195. Even in Mozert, in which parents requested an exemption from an entire course, the
school initially granted exemptions—apparently without any ensuing administrative burdens.
Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1060 (6th Cir. 1987).
196. Courts have held that the parental right must give way when the consequences would
cause significant financial burdens to the school. See, e.g., Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist.,
135 F.3d 694, 700 (10th Cir. 1998) (upholding a school’s policy that prohibited part-time
attendance based on funding constrictions on the ground that “decisions as to how to allocate
scarce resources, as well as what curriculum to offer or require, are uniquely committed to the
discretion of local school authorities”).
197. See supra notes 177–80 and accompanying text.
198. Good, supra note 24, at 677–78.
199. See Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1074 (Boggs, J., concurring) (“Though the [school] board
recognized that their allegedly compelling interests in shaping the education of Tennessee
children could not be served at all if they drove the children from the school, the board felt it
better not be associated with any hybrid [critical reading] program.”); Good, supra note 24, at
678 (“The upside is that the child and parent are free to exercise their beliefs, but the downside
is that those same beliefs become hidden from both majority understanding and critique. Such a
system certainly cannot be said to promote diversity and tolerance.”).
200. Good, supra note 24, at 676; see also Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2637 (2007)
(Alito, J., concurring) (“Most parents, realistically, have no choice but to send their children to
public school and little ability to influence what occurs in the school.”).
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201

beliefs. The Supreme Court has consistently affirmed the value of
202
diversity in education, and religious and philosophical diversity
makes a valuable contribution to education.
Some courts have expressed concern that an exemption for sexed programs will open the floodgates for “countless moral, religious,
or philosophical objections that parents might have to other [school]
203
decisions.” So long as a parent objects to a discrete program,
however, there is indeed no constitutional basis for granting or
204
denying relief based on the rationale underlying that objection. An
exemption from an assembly or survey discussing violence would not
be any more burdensome than exemptions from sex-ed in similarly
205
discrete and isolated situations. A problem arises, however, when
parents’ objections—regardless of their bases—are so pervasive that
an exemption would deprive children of an effective education.
IV. THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES
When parental objections are not tied to discrete events, a courtordered remedy becomes less feasible. Although courts may grant
exemptions without stepping too heavily on schools’ toes, judges are
206
ill-equipped to craft educational policy. Courts are appropriately
reluctant to interfere with a public school’s determination of

201. Good, supra note 24, at 677–78; see also Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1073–74 (Boggs, J.,
concurring) (lamenting that, absent accommodation, public schools are “entitled to say, ‘my way
or the highway’”).
202. E.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003).
203. Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1206 (9th Cir. 2005).
204. When a parent’s objection (whatever its basis) is to a series of classes, however, then an
exemption may be inappropriate if it would effectively deprive the child of an education. See
infra Part IV. Thus a parent’s objection to a semester-long sex-ed class (which is arguably
beyond the school’s core educational functions, see supra Part III.C) will more likely be
vindicated than a parents’ philosophical objection to a math class.
205. For a discussion of the logic underlying slippery slope arguments, see generally Eugene
Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026 (2003). Specifically, the
fear that granting an exemption in one instance would lead to other requests for exemptions is
unpersuasive if there is nothing problematic about those additional exemptions—and indeed, if
those additional exemptions foster greater respect for diverse viewpoints then they are actually
desirable. See id. at 1104–05 (“When decision A alters people’s attitudes about B, this alteration
may be part of a good learning process.”).
206. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972) (“[C]ourts are not school boards or
legislatures, and are ill-equipped to determine the ‘necessity’ of discrete aspects of a State’s
program of compulsory education.”). Moreover, permitting courts to craft educational policy
would be highly discretionary and therefore give rise to unpredictable and potentially arbitrary
results. See supra note 159 and text accompanying note 179.
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207

curriculum requirements, and they typically reject parents’ attempts
to exempt children from entire classes, especially when a school has
208
already offered a reasonable compromise. In some cases, parental
objections are so extensive that granting an exemption is tantamount
209
to denying their child an education. When parents’ objections are
pervasive and amorphous (that is, when they cannot be tied to a
discrete, tangible event), exemptions provide an unsatisfactory
remedy.
210
Parker v. Hurley, a First Circuit case, illustrates the problems
that arise with pervasive objections. Parents whose kindergarten and
second-grade children were given books depicting same-sex
211
relationships challenged a public school’s authority to do so. The
court rejected the parents’ claims, holding that the parents’ MeyerPierce right does not entitle parents to an exemption from certain
212
books used in public schools and that no free exercise violation had
213
occurred. The court distinguished Brown due to factual and legal

207. See, e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1070 (6th Cir. 1987)
(reversing the district court’s grant of an exemption for children whose parents objected to a
“critical reading” class); Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395, 402 (D.N.H. 1974) (denying objecting
parents the right to exempt their children from a public school’s proposed “Health Education”
course).
208. In Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003), a father sought to exempt his
son from a public school’s seventh grade health class requirement. Id. at 135. The school had
granted exemptions for the six classes dealing with sexuality but required attendance at the
other classes. Id. at 136. Despite the father’s religious and moral objections to the school
teaching his son about drugs and tobacco, id. at 137–38, the court held that it would be “difficult
or impossible” for a public school to meet the educational needs of its students if every parent
had a fundamental right to dictate his child’s curriculum, id. at 141.
209. See Davis, 385 F. Supp. at 401 (“If these children are allowed to leave the classroom
whenever audio-visual equipment is being used, then they will be denied an effective
education.”). In Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395 (D.N.H. 1974), parents challenged a public
school’s use of audiovisual equipment as violating their parental rights and free exercise of
religion. Id. at 398. The court denied the parents’ request for an exemption from the use of all
audiovisual equipment, but did grant an exemption when audiovisual equipment was being used
for entertainment rather than educational purposes. Id. at 401.
210. Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008).
211. Id. at 92–93. The parents, however, objected to any mention of same-sex relationships
to their children. See id. at 105 (“In the present case, the plaintiffs claim that the exposure of
their children, at these young ages and in this setting, to ways of life contrary to the parents’
religious beliefs violates their ability to direct the religious upbringing of their children. . . . The
heart of plaintiffs’ free exercise claim is a claim of ‘indoctrination’: that the state has put
pressure on their children to endorse an affirmative view of gay marriage and has thus undercut
the parents’ efforts to inculcate their children with their own opposing religious views.”).
212. Id. at 102.
213. Id. at 99.
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differences, but nevertheless held that parents do not have a right to
limit public schools’ decisions to expose children to matters relating
215
to sex so long as a school acts within its educational mission.
Parker is an especially intriguing case because of the
pervasiveness of the parents’ objection. Their complaint was not
limited to a specific class, event, or educational practice but was
instead a much broader objection to the discussion of same-sex
216
relationships. Although same-sex relationships may raise questions
among young children, merely referencing them cannot be called sex
217
education. Unlike cases involving discrete events, a school cannot
easily predict when or how the subject of same-sex relationships may
arise in the course of a school day.
Parker illustrates the broader problem that arises when parents
object not to a specific incident but rather to the general worldview
promulgated by a public school curriculum. The nature of this
objection renders notice or exemption impossible. Parental
notification would impose insurmountable administrative and
logistical challenges on schools, and even if exemptions were feasible,
they would necessarily be so broad that children would be deprived of
an education. Such pervasive objections simply cannot be tackled by
schools, and courts are ill-equipped to devise solutions.
In these situations, parents’ obvious choice is to remove their
children from the public school system. The problem with that
solution, however, is that most parents do not have the economic
wherewithal to pursue alternate education, whether at home or
218
through private school. For the vast majority of parents, therefore,
the “choice” to remove their children from public school is illusory.
219
And yet it is these parents whose rights are most threatened. A
constitutional right with no practical remedy leaves these parents with
214. Id. at 100–01 (noting that Brown involved an assembly for high school students whereas
Parker involved the education of elementary school students).
215. Id. at 96 n.7.
216. Id. at 90; see supra note 211.
217. This is particularly true in Massachusetts, where same-sex marriage is recognized
legally. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 970–71 (2003) (Greaney, J.,
concurring) (recognizing same-sex marriage on the basis of an equal protection analysis).
Indeed, in the context of Massachusetts’s marriage laws, these parents’ claim seems especially
futile and difficult to accommodate.
218. Good, supra note 24, at 676; see also Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2637 (2007)
(Alito, J., concurring) (“Most parents, realistically, have no choice but to send their children to
public school and little ability to influence what occurs in the school.”).
219. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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little recourse. The stakes are high not only for parents but also for
220
society.
CONCLUSION
Professor Richard Garnett explains why parents’ right to control
the moral and religious upbringing of their children must be taken
seriously:
[I]t looks like the emerging consensus in political theory is that the
poet, William Ross Wallace, was right (as was the creepy movie):
The hand that rocks the cradle rules the world. In other words, those
who decide what children may and should learn thereby shape, if not
determine, those children’s character and commitments, as well as
221
those of the community.

Because parental involvement is vital to the health of a liberal
republic, and because children’s flourishing is inextricably related to
parental involvement, public schools cannot unilaterally usurp the
parental role. When parents object to discrete programs and events,
they are entitled to notice and an opportunity to exempt their child.
Without this right, a parent’s “choice” to send his child to public
school is meaningless. But this remedy has limitations and cannot
offer a satisfactory resolution to the infinite hypothetical conflicts that
may arise between parents and schools.
At its core, the inevitable conflict between parents and schools
favors school choice. If parents were able to take their money with
them, then their right to leave public schools would be significantly
more meaningful. This is a job for state legislatures and school
districts. If parents can exercise greater choice, then administrative
concerns will dissipate as parents freely select the educational
environment most consonant with their values and preferences,
largely eliminating the need for accommodation through exemptions.
School choice is a truly liberal solution to the goals of publicly funded
liberal education. It respects every viewpoint by actually enabling
parents to direct their children’s education and upbringing according
to their individual values and beliefs. This is a sharp contrast to the
current system, which gives lip service to parental rights while
silencing any attempt to exercise them.

220. See supra Part II.A; supra notes 142–46 and accompanying text.
221. Garnett, supra note 142, at 121.

